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Because of the headlong rush of events in China since Mao’s death, research 
about the Cultural Revolution turmoil of 1966–68 and about the 1970s period of 
radical policy-making has received short shrift during recent decades. It used to 
be that a period was most productively studied in detail once the dust had settled, 
years after the events. Thus a good deal of excellent research about the 1950s was 
conducted during the 1960s and 1970s, and much of the important work about the 
1960s, including studies of the grass-roots upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, 
was carried out a decade later, during the mid- to late 1970s. But with a few 
exceptions, during the 1980s and 1990s the traumatic periods of the 1960s and 
1970s were neglected by scholars. This lamentably leaves us with too little 
knowledge of what transpired at the grass roots during those two earlier decades 
of PRC history, with large areas of important research still left undone.  
It has been a missed opportunity. The Western-language research of the 
1960s and 1970s was necessarily conducted from abroad through documentation 
and by interviewing émigrés in Hong Kong. From the 1980s onward, researchers 
have been able to go directly to sources within China, which can provide 
considerably richer information than was available to the earlier generation of 
scholars. However, we have not taken advantage of this, and the chance to 
conduct interview research about the Cultural Revolution is now dwindling. The 
memories of participants in the Cultural Revolution disorder of 1966–68 are 
fading, and the older generation of participants has begun to pass away. 
The dearth of Western-language scholarship has been matched by a 
reluctance among PRC-based scholars to conduct studies about the Cultural 
Revolution turmoil, inasmuch as the government prefers that the Chinese people 
let sleeping dogs lie. In the 1980s the government designated publications about 
the Cultural Revolution upheavals of 1966–68 to be among the “Four No’s”, and 
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even today it prefers to see the topic avoided. Only a relative handful of authors 
from within the People’s Republic—such as Xu Youyu and Yin Hongbiao1—
have persisted. Beyond the reach of censors, another handful of Chinese authors 
have tenaciously continued to conduct such research from abroad.2 
Much of the English-language research of the 1970s, as well as the work of 
the few researchers today who write in Chinese, focused on the sometimes 
violent factionalism that erupted in the Cultural Revolution at the grass roots—
within schools, factories, offices, county towns and villages. These Cultural 
Revolution divisions provided a unique window on the hidden tensions and 
antagonisms in Chinese society in the years leading up to the Cultural 
Revolution. In the heat of the 1966–68 upheaval, under the cover of Maoist 
rhetoric, socio–economic groups that were disgruntled with their pre-Cultural 
Revolution situations came into conflict with groups that wished to preserve the 
status quo. These various groups’ big-character posters and newsletters, plus 
interviews with émigrés in Hong Kong, provided outside observers with a gold-
mine of information and insight into a socio–political system that, until these 
upsurges from below, had remained hidden from view.   
Given this background, The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History is a 
welcome new addition to the literature. The book’s lacunae, however, lead me to 
go beyond a review of a single book to a full-fledged discussion of what is 
                                                 
1  For example, Xu Youyu, Xingxing cece de zaofan: hongweibing jingshen suzhi de 
xingcheng ji yanbian (The Shapes and Colors of Rebellion: The Formation and Evolution of 
the Spirit of the Red Guards) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999); Xu Youyu, 
“Wenge zhong hongweibing de paibie douzheng” (Red Guard Factional Struggle in the 
Cultural Revolution), Zhongguo yanjiu (China Studies), No. 2 (Autumn 1996); Yin 
Hongbiao, “Hongweibing yundong de liang da chaoliu” (The Two Tidal Surges of the Red 
Guard Movement), Ershiyi shiji (21st Century), No. 13 (1993), pp. 26-38; Yin Hongbiao, 
“Wenhua geming zhongde wudou” (Armed Struggle in the Cultural Revolution), Zhongguo 
yanjiu (China Studies), No. 2 (Autumn 1996). 
2  Yang Xiaokai (née Yang Xiguang), who passed away in 2004, wrote stimulating pieces in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s on the nature of grass-roots Cultural Revolution factionalism, 
in Hong Kong magazines such as Zhengming (Contention) (e.g., August 1990, pp. 68-70) 
and in émigré magazines such as Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) (e.g., August 1990, pp. 
42-45). Liu Guokai, who from within China secretly wrote analyses of the grass-roots 
Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, has persisted in writing on this theme over the past quarter 
of a century in New York. He has recently published two books: Guangdong hongqipai de 
xingwang (The Rise and Fall of the Red Flag Faction in Guangdong) (Hong Kong: Boda 
Chubanshe, 2006); and Wenhua geming jianxi (A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution) 
(Hong Kong: Boda Chubanshe, 2006). This latter book is almost entirely different from a 
mimeographed book of the same title which Liu Guokai penned in the 1970s while in China 
(see further below, note 13). Song Yongyi and several colleagues have made a prodigious 
effort from abroad to facilitate Cultural Revolution studies not only through their own essays 
but also by gathering all worthwhile documentation into CD-Roms. They have already 
released a massive “Cultural Revolution Database” of the official Chinese documents of the 
time, including memos and instructions (this CD-Rom is published by Universities Service 
Centre for China Studies, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong). They are preparing a 
second CD-Rom that will contain all of the known Red Guard newsletters and the unofficial 
publications of other types of grass-roots organizations. 
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already known about how the Cultural Revolution affected various sectors of 
Chinese society, and what still needs to be found out. But let us first examine the 
book. 
The New Book’s Topics 
In this new edited volume, eight young US-based scholars have published the 
findings of their investigations into the Cultural Revolution upheaval and the 
Maoist 1970s. Six of the eight are Doctoral research students at the University of 
California, San Diego, and two are assistant professors elsewhere in the US. A 
majority of them have based their chapters on fieldwork inside China, which has 
long been needed. 
Only three of the chapters deal with the Cultural Revolution strife of 1966–
68. The first of these, by Xiaowei Zheng, examines Red Guard factionalism at 
Beijing’s Qinghua University, and “stresses the role of passion and ideological 
convictions” (p. 61). Zheng concludes that the Qinghua participants “did not base 
their choices solely on personal interests” (p. 63) but rather were swept up in an 
idealistic effort to decipher and then execute Mao’s beliefs. The second of the 
chapters, by Dahpon David Ho, probes the Destroy the Four Olds movement of 
1966–67, in which students ransacked homes and temples to destroy “feudal old 
culture” such as classics of literature, artwork and religious items. He focuses in 
particular on the unsuccessful efforts by students to lay waste to the Confucian 
Temple complex in Qufu, the home town of Confucius. Ho does not explore the 
motives of the students in the Destroy the Four Olds movement, but instead 
examines the brave individuals at Qufu and elsewhere who tried to protect and 
preserve China’s cultural relics. The third of the three chapters, “Mass Killings in 
the Cultural Revolution: A Study of Three Provinces”, by Yang Su, is based upon 
county gazetteers that have been published in China during the 1980s and 1990s. 
He finds that the bulk of the mass killings were carried out under the auspices of 
local officials. All three of these chapters, in short, bypass the question of 
whether underlying divisions in Chinese society may have played a role in the 
Cultural Revolution turmoil. 
The five other empirical chapters delve into later periods. The first of these 
chapters, by Jiangsui He, focuses on the case of a former landlord who was killed 
in April 1969 in the village of Yangjiagou in the last phases of the Cleansing of 
Class Ranks campaign. Throughout the chapter, the author assumes that 
harmonious relations were the natural course in the village, and only outside 
interference by the state upset this harmony. She even projects this absence of 
tensions or grievances within village society back in time to earlier eras: 
Before the communists arrived, Yangjiagou was a cooperative community. 
Peasants worked for the Ma landlords and, in exchange, the Ma landlords 
provided the villagers with aid when they needed it. In the face of outside 
threats, landlords and peasants often worked together to safeguard their 
community. Moreover, in the everyday world of the village, landlords and 
tenants were perceived to be neighbors, relatives, and even friends (p. 150). 
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This conception of the past, when generalized to Chinese villages as a whole, 
prompts the question of how, in the harmonious world of China, the Communists 
ever rose to power.  
A chapter by Elya J. Zhang explores the rise and fall of Li Qinglin, a 
schoolteacher who gained national fame in 1973 when he wrote a letter to 
Chairman Mao complaining that his son, who had been sent to settle in the 
countryside, did not have the wherewithal to support himself. The Chairman 
responded sympathetically, and on the basis of Mao’s reply Li rapidly rose 
politically in his native province of Fujian. In doing so, he opportunistically 
played the role of an “attack dog”, to use the author’s term, and the consequence 
was that he quickly fell when Mao died, and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. 
The chapter is a well-told tale of one of the most famous of the “helicopters” who 
ascended to power in the 1970s through a (vague) association with the Chairman 
or with one of his leading followers. Another chapter, by Jeremy Brown, deals 
with an entire village that rose into national stardom in 1974 through a chance 
visit by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing. She admired some singing there, and before long 
the village was transformed through China’s propaganda mills into a famous 
model of revolutionary singing, dancing and poetry reading. After Mao’s death 
the village’s Party secretary went to prison for a year for having become another 
presumptuous “helicopter”.  
The two remaining chapters deal with science in the 1970s and with two 
short novels from the post-Mao era about the experiences of urban young people 
who in the 1970s went to settle in the countryside. The chapter on science, by 
Sigrid Schmalzer, focuses on paleontology and finds that, despite the official 
rhetoric about scientific creativity flowing from the masses, in reality “even in 
the most radical period, the notion that the masses were ‘superstitious’ 
outweighed any idea that they might have had any special access to knowledge” 
or creativity (p. 210). The chapter by Liyan Qin compares two novellas—one 
from the 1980s that portrayed the sent-down youths through a rosy lens of 
heroism and idealism and one from the 1990s that focused on the underside of the 
sent-down youths’ rural experiences. On the basis of these two novellas, the 
author concludes that only “after the failure of the 1989 student movement and 
the official establishment of a market economy” did Chinese writers begin “to 
truly turn against the Cultural Revolution and the whitewashing of its history” 
(p. 365). I find this conclusion puzzling, since as early as the late 1970s a school 
of writing had emerged in China called “wounded” or “scar” literature, which 
was read avidly because of its melodramatically scathing portrayal of how the 
Maoist 1970s affected people’s lives.3 This was followed in the 1980s by a school 
of writing called “reportage literature” which was even more forthright in its 
depiction of the terrible underside of the Maoist 1970s,4 as well as nuanced pieces 
                                                 
3  A sample of this literature is contained, for example, in Lu Xinhua et al., The Wounded 
(Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1979). 
4  A powerful example is Liu Binyan’s “The Second Kind of Loyalty”, available in Perry Link 
(ed.), Liu Binyan: Two Kinds of Truth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 
149-207. 
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such as Yang Jiang’s memoir of an enforced rural stay in a so-called May 7th 
Cadre School.5 
In sum, the new book tackles a wide range of topics that in one way or 
another explore how China’s political sphere directly or indirectly affected events 
at a non-élite level from the start of the Cultural Revolution up until Mao’s death 
a decade later. The broad sweep of subject-matter is held together by the notion 
that all of the chapters somehow relate to the “Cultural Revolution”. Most of the 
individual chapters are worth reading in their own right, but I believe the book as 
a whole suffers from two problematical aspects: how it defines and periodizes the 
Cultural Revolution; and the absence of any discussion of the social divisions that 
were revealed in the Cultural Revolution.  
Periodization of the Cultural Revolution 
As has become commonplace in writings about the Cultural Revolution, the book 
consistently refers to the Cultural Revolution as a single decade-long period 
stretching from 1966 through 1976. In doing so, the chapters conflate the bottom-
up Cultural Revolution turmoil of 1966–68 with the politically repressive periods 
of 1969–76. As will be observed, this has affected some of the book’s analysis 
and conclusions. 
In the 1970s, the Chinese were quite clear in their own minds about the 
distinction between these periods. When I conducted interviews during the mid-
1970s, interviewees invariably talked about the Cultural Revolution in the past 
tense. It was widely accepted that it had ended with the suppression of the mass 
factions in the summer and autumn of 1968. By the late summer of that year, 
China was in the midst of what was arguably the most vicious top-down political 
campaign in the history of the People’s Republic—the Cleansing of Class Ranks 
campaign. The mass organizations of the Cultural Revolution were suppressed—
the exact weeks and months differed across provinces and between countryside 
and cities. Urban high school and university students, who had been battling each 
other as Red Guards, were corralled back to their classrooms, sometimes under 
army supervision. There they awaited assignments to the countryside or (if they 
were fortunate in their parentage) to urban jobs. They spent the latter part of the 
Cleansing of Class Ranks campaign at their new assignments (usually in 
villages), and witnessed the unfolding campaign there. Through the terror of this 
“struggle campaign”, in which millions of people were persecuted and hundreds 
of thousands died,6 the government was determined to hammer home the lesson 
                                                 
5  Yang Jiang, Six Chapters from My Life ‘Down Under’ (Seattle; Hong Kong: University of 
Washington Press; Chinese University Press, 1984).  
6  The numbers of people who suffered during this campaign can be gauged by reference to 
Guangdong Province. In 1974, the recently restored provincial Party Secretary, Zhao 
Ziyang, established a group to collect figures on the scale of repression in Guangdong 
during the Cleansing of Class Ranks period. The research group’s findings were that, in 
Guangdong Province alone, close to 40,000 people were killed during the campaign and 
about a million were “struggled” against and put under “surveillance” or thrown into 
irregular jails (niu lan). On this see Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger (eds), 
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that the newly restored local political structures and hierarchy were to be obeyed 
without question. No one was left in doubt by the close of 1968 that the Cultural 
Revolution was over.  
Very occasionally in the 1970s, when specifically discussing the top national 
leadership, an interviewee would indicate that the Cultural Revolution had 
officially ended with the 9th Party Congress in 1969, when Lin Biao was anointed 
as Mao’s successor. But no one whom I interviewed in the 1970s ever considered 
the Cultural Revolution to be ongoing.7 To them, the Cultural Revolution was a 
two-year period of collapsed Party control and mass turmoil—for some 
interviewees, an exciting and liberating time; for others, distressingly chaotic. 
They sharply contrasted the Cultural Revolution with the succeeding years of 
repressive campaigns,8 radical top-down programs in education and the economy, 
and a strong “class line”.  
Why, then does the new book obfuscate this distinction between periods? To 
understand this, we must look at the Chinese Communist Party’s own 
periodization of modern Chinese history.9 Initially, Party officials spoke as 
though the Cultural Revolution had already ended. However, in October 1974, a 
pronouncement by Mao Zedong was released that stated: “The Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution is already in its eighth year. Now it’s good to have stability, 
and the entire Party and army ought to unite”.10 Nervous officials who were keen 
to be seen as loyal followers of Mao’s every utterance duly began to refer to the 
Cultural Revolution in official declarations as ongoing—unlike the ordinary 
populace, as exemplified by interviewees. At the 11th Party Congress in August 
                                                                                                                                    
On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System: The Li Yizhe Debates (Armonk: 
M. E. Sharpe, 1985), pp. 7, 41.  
7  This was also evident from some of the writings of this period. Among several examples in 
my bookshelf is a book of literature published in Hong Kong in 1974 by a group of young 
people newly arrived from the PRC, to which they gave the subtitle Selected Post-Cultural 
Revolution Verse by Chinese Youths (Gan you geyin dongdi ai: wenhua da geming hou 
Zhongguo qingnian shi wenxuan [Songs of Earth-shaking Sorrow: Selected Post-Cultural 
Revolution Verse by Chinese Youths]) (Hong Kong: Qishi Niandai Shuangzhoukan Chuban, 
1974). 
8  The devastating “One Hit, Three Antis” campaign, almost as horrific in its effects as the 
Cleansing of Class Ranks campaign, erupted in 1970–71. The period was also marked by a 
vicious mass campaign to ferret out so-called May 16th Elements (vast numbers of people 
were arrested and persecuted on fabricated charges of belonging to an imaginary 
conspiratorial group) and other intermittent “struggle campaigns”.  
9  My discussion of periodization draws in part from Anita Chan, “Dispelling Misconceptions 
about the Red Guard Movement: The Necessity to Re-examine Cultural Revolution 
Factionalism and Periodization”, The Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 1, No. 1 
(September 1992), pp. 61-85. 
10  Liu Ji (ed.), Zhongguo Gongchangdang 70 nian (70 Years of the Communist Party) 
(Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), p. 711; also Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong 
wengao (Mao Zedong’s Drafts since the Establishment of the PRC), Vol. 30 (Beijing: 
Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998), p. 402. I am grateful to Warren Sun for bringing 
these sources to my attention. 
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1977, Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, announced that the official usage could 
finally be terminated as of that date: “The eleven year period of our country’s 
first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is declared to be successfully 
concluded, signified by the smashing of the Gang of Four”.11 Four years later, in 
1981, the Party decided to issue an official verdict on the whole period of Mao’s 
rule, and in this “Resolution on the Historical Questions of the Party”, endorsed 
by the Central Committee, Hua’s proclamation of an “eleven-year period” was 
nullified. The “ten-year Cultural Revolution” was retroactively declared to have 
ended in 1976 with Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang of Four.12  
Such a dating must have made good sense to China’s top Party leaders, since 
Mao’s death put an end to ten long years of recurrent bitter political struggles 
directly involving the Party élite, which had commenced with Mao’s unexpected 
launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Such a ten-year periodization also 
served a strategic purpose, in that it lumped together the two years of Cultural 
Revolution upsurge from mid-1966 to mid-1968, for which some parts of the 
population still felt a certain nostalgia, with the unpopular period of political 
repression and economic stagnation which followed in the 1970s. Many of the 
former Rebel Red Guards, who had been suppressed starting in 1968, despised 
the policies of the so-called Gang of Four officials of the 1970s.13 Nevertheless, 
the 1981 Resolution on the Historical Questions of the Party used the conflation 
of the Cultural Revolution with the “Gang of Four” period of the 1970s to blur 
the differences between the Rebel Red Guards of 1966–68 and the Gang of Four 
officials, lumping the two groups together as ultra-leftists as though they were 
somehow the same. By doing so, the restored Party leaders under Deng could 
discredit the Rebel faction, against which they still harbored strong grievances.14 
                                                 
11  Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 22 August 1997; also Cheng Guoyuan et al., 1976-1981 
nian de Zhongguo (China 1976–81) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998), p. 9. 
12  Hong qi (Red Flag), No. 13 (1981), p. 14. 
13  A well-known illustration is the Li Yizhe group of former Rebel Red Guards in Guangzhou, 
who launched a famous lengthy wall-poster attack against this Maoist group of officials in 
1974; this is translated in Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger (eds), On Socialist 
Democracy and the Chinese Legal System, pp. 31-86. As another illustration, Yang 
Xiguang, the author of the famous Rebel Red Guard essay, “Whither China?”, in the 1970s 
was vociferously opposed to the thinking of the Gang of Four officials; on this see Jonathan 
Unger, “Whither China?: Yang Xiguang, Red Capitalists, and the Social Turmoil of the 
Cultural Revolution”, Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 3-37. As a third 
illustration, Liu Guokai, a Rebel sympathizer who secretly wrote a monograph on the 
Cultural Revolution in the early 1970s, included a section on the Cultural Revolution’s 
aftermath in which he excoriated the “Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Cliques”. See pages 130-45 
of Liu Guokai, “A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution”, Chinese Sociology and 
Anthropology, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Winter 1986-87), pp. 1-151; this journal issue was 
republished as a book, A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
1987), with the same page numbering.  
14  Two years later, the Party leadership took its vengeance. Starting in late 1983 and 
continuing through 1984, a national campaign was launched to ferret out and jail “Three 
Kinds of People” (san zhong ren), which again conflated as targets the Cultural Revolution’s 
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The “ten year” periodization of the Cultural Revolution and the conflation of 
periods was hammered home consistently in all subsequent mass media 
publications in China, and eventually was accepted unquestioningly by new 
generations of Chinese readers.  
Not only Chinese readers fell into line. Remarkably, within just a few years 
of the Resolution’s publication the China studies field in the West had 
unconsciously reworked its chronology and categorization of periods to match 
exactly what China’s political leaders had so recently devised to meet their own 
political ends. That we should permit ourselves, as a field, to let the Chinese 
government redraw our own frame of reference and our paradigm is 
extraordinary—and a backward step that obfuscates the very nature of the 
Cultural Revolution of 1966–68.  
This can be observed in the new book. As noted, only three of the eight 
empirical chapters focus (either wholly or partially) on the Cultural Revolution of 
1966–68, while the other five chapters, which refer to themselves as Cultural 
Revolution chapters, focus entirely on topics from the succeeding periods.15 I 
personally enjoyed almost all of these various chapters. They are well researched, 
well written, and contribute to our knowledge of these under-studied periods. But 
despite these chapters’ merits, the point stands that the book as a whole adds to 
the confusion about what the Cultural Revolution constituted. 
The effects of this confusion in time periods can be seen clearly, to cite one 
example, in the chapter on mass killings in the Cultural Revolution. The author, 
Yang Su, concludes: 
Most mass killings took place when the party-state began to form new local 
governments and to demobilize mass organizations … The fact that most of 
them occurred after the revolutionary committees [the title given to the re-
established local government leadership] were put in place indicates that mass 
killings were the result of the repression by the local state rather than the result 
of conflicts between independent mass groups (pp. 97, 121). 
In short, most of the killings that he records were carried out under the 
auspices of local rural officials in the initial phases of the Cleansing of Class 
Ranks campaign. By considering all of the periods into the early 1970s as 
uniformly part of the Cultural Revolution, Yang Su ends up confusing the 
Cultural Revolution with its suppression and the terrible acts of vengeance 
                                                                                                                                    
Rebel factions of 1966–68 and followers in the 1970s of the Gang of Four. The “three kinds 
of people” to be punished for events reaching back as much as one and a half decades were: 
1) followers of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four; 2) people who had been seriously affected by 
factional motives; and 3) “smashers” and “grabbers” of the 1966–68 period. Large numbers 
of former grass-roots Rebel faction leaders were rounded up in this campaign and 
imprisoned. 
15  The new book under review is not the only book on the “Cultural Revolution” that largely 
focuses on the 1969–76 period. For instance, only 1½ chapters out of the 12 chapters of a 
1991 book, New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution (edited by William A. Joseph, 
Christine Wong and David Zweig [Cambridge: Harvard University Press]), involve the 
Cultural Revolution of 1966–68; almost the whole of that book deals with the 1970s.  
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exacted at that time. This confusion is nowhere better seen than in the chapter’s 
concluding paragraph: 
This leads us to the second defining feature of the Cultural Revolution: state 
sponsorship. Previous research often focused on preexisting social divisions that 
allegedly motivated mass movements. But as I have shown above, not only did 
the state lead the movement through policy pronouncements, but also local state 
actors took the interpretations into their own hands. One of the consequences 
was the large-scale violence examined here.  
It of course isn’t the case that a defining feature of the Cultural Revolution 
was that it either consisted of an upsurge of mass movements or that the Cultural 
Revolution was under state sponsorship and was violently organized by local 
officials. Rather, it is a question of different time periods. Preexisting social 
tensions motivated the division of significant parts of the populace into opposing 
mass factions during the Cultural Revolution upheaval. Local officials took into 
their own hands how to interpret central policy pronouncements during the 
subsequent period in which the Cultural Revolution activities had been crushed 
and vengeance was exacted. Had our field retained a clear distinction between 
the Cultural Revolution and the repressive period that followed it, the chapter 
would not have possessed this sort of confusion. The bulk of the chapter is, in 
fact, excellent—the author’s empirical research in Chinese county gazetteers 
about the timing of the mass killings is very well done, and the detailed page-by-
page analyses are interesting and persuasive. The problem simply lies with a 
periodization that distorts the author’s conclusions.16 
The Social Conflicts of the Cultural Revolution: An Unfinished Research 
Agenda 
As noted, the book does not address what had been a main thrust of the earlier 
scholarship of the 1970s: that is, research into the socio–political roots of grass-
roots conflicts in the Cultural Revolution. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with 
concentrating on other types of research topics. However, because our field has 
shifted its attention, a lacuna persists in our understanding of the turmoil of the 
Cultural Revolution. The book’s editors, who are from the older generation of 
scholars, are well aware of the previous literature on this, and part of the book’s 
Introduction focuses on those previous writings. But the empirical chapters have 
entirely turned away from such themes. One reason, of course, is that most of the 
chapters have nothing to do with the Cultural Revolution per se, but rather with 
the 1970s. Inasmuch as the Seventies have been under-studied, it is all to the 
good that these chapters have been researched. Indeed, an argument can be made 
that there is a greater need to study the Seventies than the Cultural Revolution, in 
                                                 
16  Almost exactly the same periodization issue holds for an article which Yang Su participated 
in on a similar topic: Andrew Walder and Yang Su, “The Cultural Revolution in the 
Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact”, The China Quarterly, No. 173 (March 
2003), pp. 74-101.  
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that even less has been published about the later period. But the very fact that a 
book with “Cultural Revolution” in its title has so few chapters on the Cultural 
Revolution of 1966–68 points to the pressing need for our field to tackle the 
period of the actual Cultural Revolution before it is too late. What occurred 
among China’s political élite during the Cultural Revolution can be examined 
even decades from now, as China’s archives of classified material open up, but 
what occurred at the grass roots in the mass upheavals—and why—must be 
researched soon, through interviews, or it will be forever lost to history. 
What, then, is known about the mass movements of the Cultural Revolution, 
and what still needs to be explored? During the 1970s, interviewing émigrés in 
Hong Kong, I was able to collect transcripts on a variety of local cases across 
China, most of which have never been used for publication, and in the following 
pages I will utilize some of this information to suggest where further research 
may be worthwhile. There were a substantial number of different types of 
upheavals in different sectors of society—and violent factionalism erupted within 
each of these sectors for somewhat different reasons. The question therefore 
needs to be asked separately for each sector. 
The Cultural Revolution in High Schools 
Of all the sectors of society, we know the most about why high-school students 
rose up and split into warring Red Guard factions. A substantial amount of 
research has already been accomplished on this, to the point that it is possibly the 
only type of Cultural Revolution mass movement which has been sufficiently 
researched.17 
We know that China’s high-school students faced increasingly difficult 
chances of getting admitted to a university in the years leading up to the Cultural 
Revolution, and increasingly difficult career prospects if they were not admitted. 
In these same years, the criteria laid down by the government for getting into 
university kept shifting, but on the whole they gave progressively greater play to 
                                                 
17  The literature on the social origins of high-school Red Guard factionalism includes Hong 
Yung Lee’s pioneering studies based on Red Guard broadsheets, “The Radical Students in 
Kwangtung during the Cultural Revolution”, The China Quarterly, No. 64 (December 
1975), pp. 645-83, and Lee’s The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978). Also see Stanley Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism and 
the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Anita 
Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard 
Generation (London; Seattle: The MacMillan Press; University of Washington Press, 1985); 
Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-
1980 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), Chs. 5-6; Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen 
and Jonathan Unger, “Students and Class Warfare: The Social Roots of the Red Guard 
Conflict in Canton”, The China Quarterly, No. 83 (Autumn 1980), pp. 397-446; the 
Chinese-language writings of Yang Xiaokai; and Joel Andreas, “Battling over Political and 
Cultural Power in the Cultural Revolution”, Theory and Society, Vol. 31, No. 4 (August 
2002), pp. 463-519. A discussion of the differing perspectives of Rebel and Loyalist 
supporters about the divisions in Chinese society is contained in Anita Chan, “Images of 
China’s Social Structure: The Changing Perspectives of Canton Students”, World Politics, 
Vol. 34, No. 3 (April 1982), especially pp. 295-316. 
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a parent’s class origin and less to a student’s academic achievement. A third 
criterion was also evaluated by admissions officers: a student’s political activism. 
This was judged in terms of whether a student had been accepted into the 
Communist Youth League.18 Ambitious students vied with each other to get in. 
The students of middling-class (yibande chengfen) origins (whose parents before 
the revolution had been peddlers, white-collar workers, professionals and so on) 
were disturbed by policies in the mid-1960s that gave increased priority in 
Communist Youth League admissions to students of red-class origins (the 
children of pre-Liberation workers, poor peasants and Communist Party cadres). 
In these circumstances, amidst rising tensions among students, the official policy 
in 1965 swung yet again, in the realization that millions of students of non-red 
family background were becoming discouraged at their chances of ever proving 
their activist political devotion. When Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 
May 1966, the high-school students of red family origin took advantage of the 
new campaign’s thrust against “bourgeois authorities” and “white experts” to set 
up Red Guard groups and to exclude non-red-origin students from participating.19 
It was during this early phase of the Cultural Revolution, in the summer and 
early autumn of 1966, that the Destroy the Four Olds movement erupted. Red-
class students stormed into bad-class households to destroy books, furniture and 
artwork, and middling-class students were only allowed to tag along as on-
lookers. The middling-class children of intellectuals were strongly discomfited by 
this display of zealotry, as the confiscated and burned objects were similar to 
items in their own homes. In short, the Destroy the Four Olds was used by red-
class high-school students to denigrate the impurity of “bourgeois” households 
and to lower the esteem of their middling-class classmates and competitors. It 
would have been interesting if Dahpon David Ho’s chapter had examined the 
motives of the Red Guard perpetrators of the attack against the Confucian temple 
complex. This is especially the case since, from his description, the organizers of 
this attack were not high-school students but rather university students, a sector 
in society that was differently motivated from high-school students (as will be 
seen in the next section).  
In the autumn and winter of 1966, when Mao shifted the fledgling Cultural 
Revolution campaign more solidly against “capitalist roaders in the Party”, the 
middling-class high-school students formed their own Red Guard groups and 
“turned the spearhead” away from “bourgeois authorities” and toward errant local 
                                                 
18  For example, Susan Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies 
in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Jonathan Unger, Education 
Under Mao. 
19  A partial exception to this scenario was the boarding high school of Dai Hsiao-ai, whose 
story fills the book Red Guard. The students there came from all over Guangdong Province, 
and in the period before the Cultural Revolution the issue of students’ family origins was 
trumped by regional identities: students divided along the lines of where they came from and 
their native dialect (pp. 4-5). But even in this high school, when the Cultural Revolution 
erupted the red-class students banded together to form the original Red Guard organization 
and excluded the students of non-red origins. Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto, 
Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972).  
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Party leaders, a group that, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, included many of 
the parents of their red-class schoolmates. Violent clashes between the opposing 
Red Guard factions erupted among high-school students across China, and in 
particular at the élite high schools where students had been competing most 
vigorously to get into a university. A recent article by Joel Andreas, discussing 
the élite high school attached to Beijing’s Qinghua University, reconfirms this 
scenario—of growing tensions among students on the eve of the Cultural 
Revolution and a split into opposing Red Guard groups largely along class-origin 
lines. At this school: 
During the year or so preceding the Cultural Revolution, children of 
revolutionary cadres [namely, children of veteran Communist officials] … had 
accused the principal, Wan Bangru, of favoring children of the old educated 
elites. He had allowed the latter to gain undue positions in the Youth League, 
they complained, by failing to implement the class line policies. Children of 
intellectuals fought back, at one point waging a wall poster campaign criticizing 
the principal for caving in to parental pressure by failing to punish the son of a 
high cadre for fighting. Fractures were appearing … that would develop into 
violent factional antagonisms during the Cultural Revolution, organized largely 
along lines of class origin.20 
While, in the new book under review, Xiaowei Zhang’s study of Qinghua 
University finds no discernible interest-group behavior there, at the high school 
right next door it was palpable. 
A somewhat similar story played out in the élite high schools of Changsha in 
Hunan Province,21 and in Guangzhou in the far south of the country.22 In the cities 
for which we have information, the children of the officials overwhelmingly 
participated in what became known colloquially as the Loyalist or Conservative 
Red Guard faction, while the middling-class students from educated families 
gravitated overwhelmingly into the Rebel Red Guard faction. We have less 
information about the behavior of students from working-class families, but 
studies of Guangzhou show that they split down the middle in their factional 
allegiances. One reason was that at the non-élite junior high schools, where they 
predominated, fewer students were vying to climb into higher education. The 
split among students in these working-class junior high schools was often 
between the League members, who had stood over their classmates in positions 
of authority, and the less ambitious non-activist students, who resented the 
activists and became Rebel Red Guards. It should be noted, though, that the 
                                                 
20  Joel Andreas, “Battling over Political and Cultural Power in the Cultural Revolution”, p. 
476.  
21  On the experience in an élite Changsha high school, and the subsequent composition of the 
rebel Shengwulian faction in the Cultural Revolution, see Jonathan Unger, “Whither 
China?”. 
22  A number of the citations in footnote 17 deal with the evidence from Guangzhou high 
schools: see Hong Yung Lee’s China Quarterly article, and the three books and China 
Quarterly article by Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger. 
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE GRASS ROOTS      121 
 
 
working-class students who joined the loose city-wide Rebel Red Guard coalition 
tended to form their own groups separate from the Rebel Red Guards of less 
politically-correct class origins.23 Most bad-class high school students shunned 
any Cultural Revolution activity, knowing that they would be vulnerable and 
likely to suffer retribution.24 
Universities 
The students at universities were already the “winners” in the competition to 
advance through education. They did not need to worry about the same issues of 
class preferment and tightening university admissions that troubled ambitious 
high school students. All of the studies published to date, including Xiaowei 
Zheng’s in the new book, have shown that among the university students there 
was scant connection between joining a Cultural Revolution faction and any 
concrete personal “interests”. It should be noted, though, that all of the published 
studies have focused on élite universities in Beijing.25 There, early in the Cultural 
Revolution, various university student groups developed direct links to top Party 
                                                 
23  Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger, “Students and Class Warfare”, p. 436. 
24  David Raddock, through interviewing in Hong Kong in the 1970s, produced a good book on 
the bad-class students’ pre-Cultural Revolution predicament and the psychological and 
social burdens they were forced to bear: Political Behavior of Adolescents in China: The 
Cultural Revolution in Kwangchow (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977). An essay 
by a bad-class youth, Yu Luoke, on the unfairness of the class line was very widely read by 
Rebel Red Guards. The essay is reproduced and analyzed in Gordon White, The Politics of 
Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution (Canberra: Contemporary 
China Centre, 1976). 
25  For example, Victor Nee, The Cultural Revolution at Peking University (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1969); William Hinton, Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution 
at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); David and Nancy Milton, 
The Wind Will Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China 1964-1969 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1976); Andrew Walder, “Beijing Red Guard Factionalism: Social Interpretations 
Reconsidered”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (May 2002), pp. 437-71; Joel 
Andreas, “Battling over Political and Cultural Power in the Cultural Revolution” [focusing 
on Qinghua University] (he brings the story forward into the 1970s in Joel Andreas, 
“Institutionalized Rebellion: Governing Tsinghua University during the Late Years of the 
Cultural Revolution”, The China Journal, No. 55 [January 2006], pp. 1-28). For his Doctoral 
dissertation, Stanley Rosen conducted interviewing in the 1970s with former Red Guards 
from the élite Beijing universities, with similar findings. (Stanley Rosen, “The Origins and 
Development of the Red Guard Movement in China, 1960-1968”, PhD dissertation, UCLA, 
1979). In a book on student Red Guards, Anita Chan sums up the experiences of an 
interviewee who had attended People’s University, one of this handful of élite Beijing 
schools: “Being in the nation’s capital, each faction soon established direct links with 
different Central Committee members and vehemently flung the pejorative label ‘Royalist’ 
at the opposing faction, claiming for itself the revolutionary title of ‘Rebel’. Both factions at 
Bai’s university not only were tied to members of the central leadership; the conflict 
between the student groups was so ideologically and politically ill-defined that by 1967 both 
the main factions, though deadly enemies, found themselves paradoxically belonging to the 
same Red Guard Headquarters. From Bai’s description, their squabblings often seem to have 
been unprincipled and petty”. Children of Mao, p. 164. 
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leaders such as Mao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhou Enlai and others, or indirect 
links through the children of top leaders, and some of the student groups became, 
at times, unwitting pawns in the factional battles at the very top. Unfortunately, 
practically everything that we know about what occurred at Chinese universities 
is based on precisely this small group of élite Beijing universities—universities 
that were anomalies due to the direct links to Party leaders. 
In the mid-1970s, I had an opportunity to interview two former students and 
a former lecturer from élite Beijing universities, and their recollections paralleled 
those of the published studies. But the lecturer also recalled a split along a 
dimension that is not evident from the others’ studies:  
The students acted in their own interest when the Cultural Revolution began. 
Those who were about to graduate were the most loyal to the Party leaders of the 
university, since their allocations to good job postings depended on those 
leaders. It was first and second-year students who were the most radical.26  
What was the scenario at universities outside Beijing? B. Michael Frolic 
interviewed a student from Amoy (Xiamen) University in Fujian, who described 
Cultural Revolution struggles between the “careerist” students from “upper-class 
Fujian families” who were good at their studies versus “the less privileged, more 
politically conscious” students.27 Interviewing which I conducted in 1975 with a 
former student at Jinan University in Guangzhou also reveals a “class”-based 
conflict among students, somewhat similar to what occurred among high-school 
students. Jinan University was financed by overseas Chinese and accommodated 
large numbers of their children, and in the Cultural Revolution these students 
rebelled against the suspect “class label” of Overseas Merchant with which they 
had been saddled.  
My interviews in the mid-1970s regarding two other universities—one in 
Yunnan and one in Guangzhou—are suggestive of another form of pre-Cultural 
Revolution tension that exploded into factional rivalry. According to my 
interviewees’ descriptions, some of the most politically active students were 
competing to gain leadership status in the Communist Youth League or were 
angling to join the Party. Both interviewees claimed that these politically activist 
students had gained the animus of those students who concentrated instead on 
their studies. When the Cultural Revolution exploded, these tensions played 
themselves out among the interviewees’ classmates as they chose one faction or 
the other, generally pitching the successfully activist students against the others. 
                                                 
26  David and Nancy Milton, who taught in Beijing at the No. 1 Foreign Language Institute 
[university], noted this distinction between the fifth-year class, which he taught, and the 
second-year class, which she taught, but they seem to have attributed it to the fact that “His 
class, partly because of its senior status, contained a large number of Party and League 
members” (The Wind Will Not Subside, p. 208). The second-year students, most of whom 
were the children of farmers due to a recent pre-Cultural Revolution ruling by the Foreign 
Ministry requiring increased worker-peasant enrolments, tended to join the opposite faction, 
which launched attacks against the school’s First and Second Party Secretaries (p. 209). 
27  B. Michael Frolic, Mao’s People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 72-79. 
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As the interviewee from Yunnan, who had been a student at the Yunnan 
Teachers-Training University, noted:  
Most of the students sought safety during the Cultural Revolution by joining the 
majority faction. This was especially true among the older students, who were 
close to graduation. But a second strong factor [in determining factional 
allegiance] was that before the Cultural Revolution, some students could be said 
to have been “persecuted”—that is, they’d been afraid of being reported on—
while other students were part of the established power as political activists: 
opportunists who were betraying others in order to climb up. Within their own 
classroom group, the activists became the Loyalists and the others became the 
Rebels.  
Interview research is sorely needed with former university students from 
across China, to divine whether similar or different types of splits erupted at their 
own universities. We have no idea today whether the most prevalent scenario at 
China’s universities is the one described above, or the one for Beijing’s 
universities, or the one that prevailed at Xiamen and Jinan Universities, or 
possibly even whether there were some other entirely different reasons for the 
divisions among classmates. In China today, many tens of thousands of former 
university students, now in their late 50s and early 60s, are readily accessible to 
be interviewed. Hopefully a researcher will sit down with some of them. 
Factories 
Two different types of explanations have been put forward to explain the 
upheavals in China’s factories and the division of the workforce into warring 
factions. The first of these explanations is offered by Andrew Walder, in an essay 
based upon interviewing in Hong Kong during the 1970s as well as reading 
worker-faction newsletters. Walder’s essay emphasizes that “conflicts within 
factories during the Cultural Revolution were shaped heavily—though not 
exclusively—by divisions created in the workforce by the Party’s political 
networks”.28 He observes that the loyalist factions were formed from among those 
workers who, prior to the Cultural Revolution, had been the trusted clients of a 
factory’s Party branch.29 (This is similar to the scenario at the university in 
Yunnan, where activists favored by the League and Party formed the loyalist 
core.) Walder does not explicitly write that disgruntled workers who were 
                                                 
28  Andrew Walder, “The Chinese Cultural Revolution in the Factories: Party-State Structures 
and Patterns of Conflict”, in Elizabeth J. Perry (ed.), Putting Class in its Place: Worker 
Identities in East Asia (Berkeley: China Research Monograph 48, Institute of East Asian 
Studies, University of California, 1996), p. 169. 
29  Walder also takes up this theme, from a different perspective, in a paper on how officials 
(including factory officials) during the Cultural Revolution upheaval made use of such 
trusted clients to defend themselves from rebel attacks; see Andrew Walder, “When States 
Unravel: How China’s Cadres Shaped Cultural Revolution Politics”, in Kjeld Erik 
Brødsgaard and Susan Young (eds), State Capacity in East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), especially pp. 178-83. 
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unfavored by Party networks stood against the loyalists, joined rebel factions and 
attacked and toppled factory leaders, but this seems consistent with his scenario. 
Interviews that I conducted in 1975–76 were in line with Walder’s findings. 
For instance, an interviewee noted that at his factory in Yunnan Province, the 
“political activists” among the workers prior to the Cultural Revolution “were 
always ready to respond to Party orders. Their special duties were to make 
reports on other people”. During the Cultural Revolution other workers turned on 
these “old activists”. Alongside this struggle, factory officials came under attack 
from one side or the other, and in the turmoil “almost all of them were pulled 
down; it wasn’t a case of some types of cadres being ousted and other types not. 
Only some of the lowest officials survived … After the Cultural Revolution [that 
is, in the early 1970s] the factory’s officials have become scared to make 
decisions and they’ve shifted a lot of the decisions to the army representative in 
the factory”. 
The second type of explanation of upheaval and factionalism within factories 
perceives the conflict in terms of opposing constituencies that had been 
materially favored or unfavored prior to the Cultural Revolution. Based on 
worker-faction newsletters, Hong Yung Lee was the first to present this scenario: 
that the radical rebel worker organizations’ members were “from the smaller, 
poorer factories, the contract and temporary workers, the apprentice and unskilled 
workers in the larger factories”.30 Notably, the apprentices, temporary workers 
and contract workers had the lowest wages, did the most onerous tasks and, 
unlike most other workers, were entitled to few or no perquisites, and the 
temporary and contract workers had no job security. Walder himself sketches out 
a scenario that is in line with such groups principally wanting better conditions. 
Although he does not explicitly adopt this scenario, it appears from his evidence 
that, whereas the loyalist faction in a factory was shaped by support for political 
networks, many members of the rebel faction in a factory were motivated by 
complaints of material deprivation and/or job insecurity, coalescing in a tacit 
interest-group politics. 
According to the Chinese author Liu Guokai, there was yet another 
dimension: younger workers gravitated toward rebel factions more often than 
their older colleagues, because “the younger workers had more guts than their 
older coworkers”.31 But the younger workers may well also have been acting on 
material complaints about their situations and poor career prospects. Elizabeth 
                                                 
30  Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Cultural Revolution, p. 340. A tabloid published by a 
group of temporary and contract workers in Shanghai was quite explicit that they were 
rebels because they saw themselves as exploited: “The purpose of hiring temporary workers 
and contract workers is to make maximum profit with minimum investment. This involves 
exploitation of the labor and surplus value of temporary and contract workers, [who] are 
kept out of such organizations as the Party, the [Communist Youth] League, and the militia”. 
Quoted in Lynn White III, Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in 
China’s Cultural Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 247. 
31  Liu Guokai, “A Brief Analysis”, p. 79. Liu presumably was generalizing from what he 
observed in Guangzhou. Hong Yung Lee reached a similar conclusion from Cultural 
Revolution mass-organization newsletters.  
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Perry and Li Xun examined who were the leaders of rebel factions in Shanghai 
factories and found that a typical leader was only about 30 years old at the start of 
the Cultural Revolution. They hypothesize that “Having logged a number of 
years on the job, with scant prospects of upward or outward mobility, they were 
ripe for a movement that offered them a chance to challenge the status quo”.32  
To the extent that the Rebel groups were composed of workers who were 
disgruntled and wanted to upturn the status quo ante, entire workforces that had 
been discriminated against in pay and status joined the Rebel side en masse. 
According to interviewing that I conducted about the situation in the city of 
Changsha, the Rebel strongholds included some of the small neighborhood firms 
of handicraft workers and tradesmen which had been collectivized in the mid-
1950s: poorly capitalized operations that, by deliberate government policy, 
provided low wages. Another group comprised construction workers, also a low-
paying trade, where the traditional wage bonuses had been suppressed in the 
1960s by the industry’s political department. Yet another militant Rebel grouping 
was composed of transport coolies who hauled freight through city streets. A 
sizeable percentage of them had reportedly been in labor camps, and performed 
this tough, very low-paid coolie labor because no one was willing to hire political 
and criminal convicts for other lines of work.33  
On the whole, the large “core” factories in heavy industry had been viewed 
by Communist Party ideology as more advanced and glorious than light industry 
or handicraft industry, and as a result these large factories had been favored by 
the government in terms of wages and workers’ perquisites. The Party was also 
better organized there, and had nurtured more political activists. During the 
Cultural Revolution upheavals, the loyalist factions normally appear to have 
predominated in such factories, while the rebel faction had a stronger footing in 
the smaller factories that were less favored by Party policy and that also 
contained a less powerful Party presence.34 
                                                 
32  Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 40.  
33  For example, see Jonathan Unger, “Whither China?”, for the composition of the militant 
Rebel Shengwulian coalition in Changsha, Hunan (p. 20). 
34  Based partly on his knowledge of Guangzhou, Liu Guokai noted these differences in 
Loyalist and Rebel strength in large vs. small factories in “A Brief Analysis”, pp. 75-76. 
Notably, in some other cities, for reasons particular to the scenarios there as the Cultural 
Revolution unfolded, the great majority of the workforces at practically all of the factories, 
large as well as small, joined the Rebel camp. An interesting first-hand account of the 
situation in the city of Guilin, Guangxi Province, by a former student Rebel Red Guard, is 
Hua Linshan, Les Années Rouges (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1987), pp. 120-35. According to 
my interviewing about Changsha, Hunan, the outnumbered Loyalist faction there fled the 
city and joined their confreres in Xiangtan, an armaments manufacturing center whose 
workers thereby enjoyed a higher political status and better conditions than other workers. 
Warfare broke out between this Loyalist city and Changsha’s triumphant Rebels. When the 
warfare died down, Changsha’s Rebel faction split into two hostile camps, the haves and 
have-nots. The more conservative of the Rebel groups, based on the red-class workers from 
large enterprises, allied themselves with red-class student groups and fought the radical 
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At a small distillery in the capital city of one of China’s inland provinces, 
where Anita Chan and I interviewed many dozens of workers and retirees during 
2002–04,35 the entire workforce had belonged to the rebel faction. The distillery 
was part of the foodstuffs processing industry, which provided low wages and 
low status. Since everyone belonged to the same faction, there was no violence or 
turmoil within the distillery.36 Most interviewees could not articulate clearly what 
each of the Cultural Revolution factions stood for, or why they all wore rebel-
faction armbands to work, but the fact that the distillery was solidly rebel was not 
a random choice—the impoverished, over-worked distillery workers had sensed 
at a semi-conscious level that people like themselves would fit into a Cultural 
Revolution rebel faction. They could not imagine that anyone who worked at 
such a poorly paid factory would have any other identification. An interviewee 
who had been appointed a Party member and “model worker” because of her 
ultra-red class background (before the revolution she had been sold into bonded 
child labor) recalls that, secretly, she was sentimentally sympathetic to the city’s 
loyalist faction. But even she habitually wore the Rebel armband every day to 
work and attended rebel rallies (the factory took roll-call, she says), since her 
coworkers all took it for granted that everyone should.37  
A few interviewees from the distillery were fully aware of why they were in 
the rebel faction. One of these, an elderly retiree who was a worker in his early 
30s when the Cultural Revolution erupted, looks back at the Cultural Revolution 
period with nostalgia: 
                                                                                                                                    
Rebels of the small, poorly regarded factories and trades and the non-red-class secondary-
school students. In some other cities, unlike Changsha, the distinctions between the warring 
camps became quite clouded by 1967, as the alignments of various subgroups and 
organizations shifted and split and re-coalesced in accordance with the vagaries of local 
repressions, desperate efforts to secure vengeance and to end up on the winning side, and 
subsequent alliances of convenience. One example is Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang 
province (Keith Forster, Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province [Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1990]). A second, according to my interviews, is Kunming, Yunnan. The city of 
Beijing could be considered a third example, though there the confused alignments at the 
grass roots may have originated in the groups’ links to varying high-level Party leaders.  
35  The nature of these interviewees’ recollections is discussed in Jonathan Unger and Anita 
Chan, “Memories and the Moral Economy of a State Enterprise”, in Ching Kwan Lee and 
Guobin Yang (eds), Re-envisioning the Chinese Revolution: The Politics and Poetics of 
Collective Memories in Reform China (Washington; Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press; Stanford University Press, 2007).  
36  Nevertheless, during 1967 the distillery director was locked up by the workers, as were the 
two leading foremen, who were seen as too strict. The latter, ironically, were principally 
accused of having been members of a working-class secret society, the Gelaohui, before the 
revolution. Such flimsy pretexts for toppling superiors seem to have sufficed during the 
Cultural Revolution upheaval. 
37  In a personal communication to me, Stanley Rosen notes that in several interviews that he 
conducted about the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou factories, the pressure to conform 
and “go along with the tide” (sui chaoliu) was similarly evident. For instance, a former 
factory cadre observed that, although he had personally preferred the rebel line, he had no 
choice but to support his factory’s loyalist mainstream for fear of jeopardizing his position. 
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE GRASS ROOTS      127 
 
 
Before the Cultural Revolution there were hidden problems. When our 
leadership said something was one, not two, it had to be accepted as one, not 
two. We could say nothing in response but just had to work more. You could 
only talk about good things and never about the bad things. During the Cultural 
Revolution, people talked about anything, without restrictions. People said 
things they dared not say before. Many things were exposed. If you wanted to 
say something you said it. Nothing could stop us. It raised people’s thinking … 
The rebel faction was made up of ordinary small people, people without any 
power. They felt wronged. You’d been under your supervisor, and there was 
nowhere to vent your dissatisfaction. It wasn’t that I personally felt any anger, 
but when you joined the rebel faction you felt better. When we talked with each 
other, we could feel a sense of relief. 
In short, such workers appear to have gravitated into the rebel ranks both 
because of feelings that they and their mates materially had been among the 
have-nots and also, as this worker observes, because they had felt themselves 
stifled by a political/administrative hierarchy that had forced them to speak and 
act against their own interests. Repeatedly, interviewees who had been high-
school Rebel Red Guards recalled a similar strong and at times exhilarating sense 
of release and freedom from the conformist pre-Cultural Revolution tensions they 
had endured. 
Looking back in old age, forty years after the Cultural Revolution upheaval, 
few of the other interviewees from the distillery share such recollections. 
Married, with families to look after, they had been simply trying to get through 
the daily grind of life as best they could, and as they tell it today, the Cultural 
Revolution turmoil seemed unsettling and at times frightening. In particular, all 
of the women interviewees look back simply at a time of chaotic violence in the 
streets, constant worries about their children and personal bafflement. Such 
feelings are nowhere to be seen in the factional mass-organization newsletters of 
the Cultural Revolution, nor do they crop up in interviews with former active 
participants. But these distillery workers’ views presumably were shared by 
many tens of millions of ordinary middle-aged people across China. 
Overall, we still know far too little about the circumstances and attitudes of 
working-class Chinese during the period of the Cultural Revolution. As Elizabeth 
Perry and Li Xun have noted in their study of Shanghai, “Worker participation 
was a critical ingredient in the social unrest of the Cultural Revolution decade, 
but the relative dearth of source materials has made it difficult to address labor’s 
involvement with anything approaching the degree of refinement attained in 
studies of the student movement”.38 The published information that I have 
presented about the groups of workers who participated, and why, was gleaned 
from the writings of less than a handful of researchers. The extant published 
information that originates from their interviewees is based on scattered 
                                                 
38  Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution, p. 
2. Notably, it has become so ingrained in our field to write of the “Cultural Revolution 
decade” that even Perry and Li inadvertently do so in this quote, even though their book 
focuses almost exclusively on the Cultural Revolution of 1966–68.  
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sources—a single interviewee from one section of one factory, another 
interviewee from another factory. So far as I know, no one has yet attempted to 
conduct fieldwork with multiple respondents at a factory site where factional 
turmoil was rife, to uncover the remembered reasons for participation (or non-
participation) in one faction or another, and the underlying pre-existing tensions 
that were exposed in the process. 
Government Offices 
I know of only one published discussion of what occurred inside an ordinary 
government bureaucratic unit. The best Chinese analyst of the Cultural 
Revolution, Liu Guokai, recounts, in the brief space of about three pages, what 
happened at his own work unit, the Guangzhou taxation bureau. There, the young 
bureau chief, who also served as the Party secretary and head of the bureau’s 
political office, was well educated and from a professional family background. 
An effort to overthrow him was launched by the ambitious head of the bureau’s 
personnel and security section, who was concurrently vice director of the political 
office. He was from a working-class family, had started as a janitor and had 
worked his way up as a political activist. He attacked the bureau chief/Party 
secretary for “having concealed important facts about his family background”. 
But most of the bureau’s members turned against the upstart, as they “hated him 
for his persecution of innocent people … in his previous work”. Liu Guokai 
himself had been a low-ranking officer in the tax bureau’s Communist Youth 
League branch, and he self-mockingly refers to himself as having been “a bully-
boy of the reactionary bourgeois line”. He sided with the “conservative” (loyalist) 
faction and was surprised when several colleagues began to avoid him and set up 
a Rebel organization: 
Being young at the time, I was puzzled at their move. Actually it was simple. 
These colleagues of mine, though acknowledged activists who had always kept 
close to the leadership and who contained among them Party members, were 
none of them political workers but clerical staff members just like myself. But 
being older and more experienced, they were politically more sensitive and had 
foreseen that the political and security personnel could not escape being the butt 
of popular anger. They did not want to accompany them to their funeral.39 
The most sagacious of all were several clerks in their forties who had worked 
under the Kuomintang regime, who “surprisingly became conservatives”: “They 
had far more political sensitivity and far-sightedness than my colleagues who had 
joined the Rebels. Well experienced in life, they were convinced that the 
Communist Party would not collapse. They took a wait-and-see attitude”.40 
This scenario is quite different from that portrayed in a monograph by Marc 
Blecher and Gordon White, about what admittedly is not the office of an urban 
                                                 
39  Liu Guokai, “A Brief Analysis”, p. 84. 
40  Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
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bureau but rather a geological survey unit in the countryside of western China.41 
Its internal operations, however, were quite similar to those of a government 
office. Given the technical nature of the work, a majority of the unit’s members 
had senior high school or tertiary educations, and the percentage of middle-class 
and bad-class personnel among the technicians was relatively high.42 Expertise 
did not equate with political authority, however. Whereas 40 per cent of the 
unit’s members had middling or bad-class backgrounds, not one of the unit’s 
Party members was of bad-class origins and only 7 per cent were of middle-class 
background.43 In the Cultural Revolution, notably, the unit split along class-origin 
lines in a fashion somewhat similar to China’s élite high schools. To quote 
Blecher and White: 
In conclusion, then, class origin seems to have had the greatest independent 
effect on factional affiliation of all the variables tested. Specifically, people of 
middling and bad class backgrounds were more likely to join the rebel faction, 
which expressed their class interests; and people of good class background were 
more likely to join the conservative faction, whose views on the class issue were 
consonant with their interests as a class.44 
The authors add an interesting finding: “that manual workers as an 
occupational group, regardless of their class backgrounds, were more likely to 
support the conservative cause than their class backgrounds would predict; i.e., 
they seem to have acted more in terms of their present class status of worker 
rather than their class origin or background. As workers, they were more 
susceptible to appeals by conservative spokesmen and by their own superiors to 
‘defend the working class’ from the attacks of rebels who were more likely to be 
intellectuals and have ‘impure’ backgrounds”.45 
It is not too late to enquire about what occurred in other white-collar work 
units. Potential interviewees are plentiful in urban China today, and some can 
even be found on university campuses abroad. As a case in point, this morning I 
conducted an interview with a former employee of China’s leading high-tech 
weaponry design institute. It was an atypical work unit, in that practically 
everyone who worked there needed to enjoy the very highest level of political 
trust. Almost all of the employees were Party members. At the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution, in what my interviewee calls the “fake Cultural Revolution” 
(wei wenge) a cadre workteam was dispatched by the national leadership to enter 
the institute. The workteam leader released the personnel files of two employees 
who were vulnerable on grounds of political and sexual transgressions, and 
                                                 
41  Marc J. Blecher and Gordon White, Micropolitics in Contemporary China: A Technical Unit 
During and After the Cultural Revolution (White Plains: M. E. Sharpe, 1979). The book’s 
information was based on a single interviewee who had a near-photographic memory. 
42  Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
43  Ibid., p. 38. 
44  Ibid., p. 79. 
45  Ibid., p. 81. 
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sought to channel the institute staff’s attacks against the two. But the staff soon 
broke ranks over solely targeting such tiny fish. The interviewee, who was a 
young engineer of sterling class background (as were all of the younger staff), 
recalls that about two-thirds of the institute’s employees, including practically all 
of the engineers and technicians, ultimately joined the rebel faction. They did so 
not because they held major grievances (all of them, after all, were among 
China’s politically favored, and the material needs of all who worked there were 
well taken care of). Rather they “rebelled” because of more subtle feelings—in 
part idealism, in that Chairman Mao had urged rebellion, and in part a desire even 
among them to be released from the confines of the daily stifling, conformist pre-
Cultural Revolution political constraints. As the interviewee notes, the highly 
educated engineers and technicians were “more independent-minded”. (They 
seem partly akin to the idealistic Qinghua University students described by 
Xiaowei Zheng in the new book; and partly akin, too, to the worker at the 
distillery who had chafed at the political constraints of the pre-Cultural 
Revolution system.) The core of the loyalist faction was composed of political 
cadres and the institute’s blue-collar workers. The interviewee explains that the 
latter “felt in a privileged position to be at the institute, and so felt loyal” (akin to 
the blue-collar workers in the geology survey team). There was also a small 
Middle Faction at the weapons institute largely composed of sons and daughters 
of well-known national Party leaders, who gradually became bystanders 
(xiaoyaopai) as the statuses of their own exalted parents became less secure. The 
interviewee felt that the actual views among the different factions were not far 
apart, which is not surprising in light of a lack of strong grievances and an 
absence of political have-nots at the institute. It is also not surprising that no 
violence and little turmoil occurred here, less so than in any other urban unit that 
I know about. 
Was any aspect of this weaponry design institute’s experience of the Cultural 
Revolution possibly typical? Was the isolated geological survey team’s “class”-
based factional composition more representative of government units? Or was the 
scenario of the tax office more typical? We have no way of knowing: the 
available information on what transpired in government units is scanty, to say the 
least. Interviewing retirees from a number of government bureaus would be 
necessary to answer such a question. 
Villages 
The upheavals in China’s vast countryside are considerably better known. The 
earliest study, by Richard Baum, was published in 1971. Based upon Chinese 
newspapers and provincial radio broadcasts, Baum was able to discuss the role of 
Red Guards from county and commune-town high schools, the actions of local 
officials to ward off, co-opt or repress their activities, the dispatch of army corps 
into the countryside in 1967 and their subsequent withdrawal, and the final 
restoration of order in 1968 after directives from Beijing to enforce the 
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establishment of so-called “revolutionary committees” in each locale.46 In the 
three and a half decades since Baum’s essay, more than a dozen village studies 
have been published that chronicle the recent histories of farming communities;47 
and scattered new documentation from China has also become available. In 
addition, over the decades I have been able to carry out interviews with people 
from 31 villages.48 Based on these sources, it becomes possible to delineate some 
of the elements of the Cultural Revolution turmoil in China’s villages. 
First, it becomes clear that upheavals were much more common than could 
be discerned from the newspapers and broadcasts to which Baum had access. 
Only slightly more than a third of the villages of my interviewees—eleven, to be 
exact—rode out the Cultural Revolution without any armed struggles between 
                                                 
46  Richard Baum, “The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of a Limited Rebellion”, 
in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971), pp. 367-476. By carefully piecing together where and when various 
types of incidents were reported to have occurred in the countryside, Baum was able to draw up 
an interesting chronological account of how the Cultural Revolution developed in the 
countryside, an account that examined the movement’s ultimate spatial distribution. His 
documentary evidence suggested that the bulk of the commune towns and rural villages which 
experienced upheavals lay relatively close to cities, railway lines, major roads or ports and that, 
generally, the closer they were, the earlier they experienced Cultural Revolution turmoil. 
47  Zhang Letian, Gaobie lixiang: Renmin gongshe zhidu yanjiu (Departing from Ideals: 
Research into the System of the People’s Commune) (Shanghai: Dongfang Chubanshe, 
1998), pp. 205-14; Zhu Xiaoyang, Zuiguo yu chengfa: Xiaocun gushi 1931-1997 (Crime and 
Punishment: The Tale of a Small Village 1931-1997) (Tianjin Guji Chubanshe, 2003), pp. 
127-32; Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz and Mark Selden, Chinese Village, Socialist 
State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 87-116; William Hinton, Shenfan: The 
Continuing Revolution in a Chinese Village (New York: Random House, 1983), pp. 509-
664; Mobo Gao, Gao Village: Rural Life in China Since the Revolution (London; Honolulu: 
Hurst & Co.; University of Hawaii Press, 1999), pp. 144-54; Philip Huang, “Rural Class 
Struggle in the Chinese Revolution: Representational and Objective Realities from the Land 
Reform to the Cultural Revolution”, Modern China, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 105-43; 
Huang Shu-min, The Spiral Road: Change in a Chinese Village Through the Eyes of a 
Communist Party Leader (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 89-98; Peter Seybolt, 
Throwing the Emperor from his Horse: Portrait of a Village Leader in China (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), pp. 65-72; Sulamith Heins Potter and Jack M. Potter, China’s 
Peasants: The Anthropology of a Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), pp. 83-90; Gregory A. Ruf, Cadres and Kin: Power, Authority, and Corporatism in a 
West China Village, 1937-1991 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), Ch. 7; Helen F. 
Siu, Agents and Victims in South China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 204-
8; Anita Chan, Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village Under Mao and Deng 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), Ch. 4; and Richard Madsen, Morality and 
Power in a Chinese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), Ch. 6.  
48  I have drawn upon those materials in Jonathan Unger, “Cultural Revolution Conflict in the 
Villages”, The China Quarterly, No. 153 (March 1998), pp. 82-106, and also Jonathan 
Unger, The Transformation of Rural China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), Ch. 3. The 
following paragraphs about China’s villages rely upon these previous writings.  
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hamlets or villages or serious eruptions from below.49 Among the villages that did 
experience conflicts, a considerable portion were of a traditional nature. For 
instance, disputes between villages over land and over access to water revived in 
1967–68 when the local Party hierarchies and local governments collapsed. In ten 
of the villages of interviewees and in several of the published village studies, 
historically rooted conflicts between a village’s different lineage groups also 
erupted, many of which involved struggles between lineages to capture a 
village’s leadership posts. In a number of villages, though, the conflicts were 
quite non-traditional, generated by tensions between a village’s overbearing Party 
cadres and disgruntled farmers or by hostility between cadres stirred up by the 
Party’s recent Four Cleanups Campaign.50 Complicating events, a large number 
of the villages that witnessed conflicts of a traditional nature also witnessed 
upheavals that were directly related to the nature of Party rule. 
Given a need to justify attacks and counter-attacks during the Cultural 
Revolution by way of “ideology”, both the traditionally-based rivalries and the 
non-traditional antagonisms often were clothed in socialist rhetoric and got acted 
out in a new “revolutionary” mode of stylized conflict. The Mao quotations that 
got brandished encouraged an exaggerated, uncompromising righteousness and 
intolerance and a recourse to violence to destroy resistance. This extreme politics 
of the Cultural Revolution period meant, quite realistically, that losing out in a 
struggle was likely to entail severe persecution. Such fears fueled mounting 
cycles of violence and counter-violence, in cities as well as in the countryside, 
among worker and student groups as well as among farmers and the self-
interested contenders for rural political power. Regarding the Cultural Revolution 
in her own village, one interviewee observed that “seeking revenge afterwards is 
very common in China, and that’s why people beat their victims down so hard: 
because they’re afraid that if they can rise again they might take revenge. So you 
feel you need to totally demolish them”. 
A second form of rural violence was also common. As the Cultural 
Revolution began to seep outwards from the cities, many commune and village 
officials began to organize farmers to mete out severe persecution against the 
bad-class households. The local leaders obviously saw it as a means of self-
protection to preside over such persecutions. They could see that one of the 
charges being leveled against urban Party leaders during the Cultural Revolution 
was that they had been insufficiently militant on behalf of Chairman Mao’s class 
line, and so rural Party officials became especially anxious to demonstrate their 
                                                 
49  When I write that a third of the villages did not experience Cultural Revolution turmoil from 
below, I am not including persecutions mounted from above by officials, nor orchestrated 
movements to struggle against and physically abuse bad-class people. The latter occurred 
almost everywhere, and was not confined to the Cultural Revolution of 1966–68: such 
persecutions were commonplace throughout most of the period of Mao’s rule. 
50  An example of the latter is described, for example, in Anita Chan, Richard Madsen and 
Jonathan Unger, Chen Village, Chs. 2-4. 
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militancy in pursuit of bad-class enemies. They convened public meetings at 
which bad-class people were “struggled against” and in some cases killed.51 
How the Cultural Revolution turmoil differed in different types of rural 
districts, and why, remains unclear. A far wider range of local accounts needs to 
be gathered and analyzed. 
County towns 
The residents of the county capitals and commune market towns had a different 
type of residence permit (hukou) than the farmers, and this provided them with a 
distinctly different set of circumstances in life. Most of them worked in urban-
like work units that paid regular salaries. Economically, socially and politically, 
their lives more closely resembled that of urban residents rather than villagers. It 
is not altogether surprising that the conflicts that embroiled many of the county 
capitals and commune towns during the Cultural Revolution closely followed the 
same chronology of events as the cities, or that the same type of factionalism 
arose there.52 This is clear from the descriptions in county gazetteers and also 
from interviews that I conducted with several former residents of towns. An 
interviewee relates that in his own town, which was a commune 
headquarters/market center, the commune clerks organized their own Rebel 
group. 
At about the same time that upheavals and factionalism began to emerge in 
the towns, in a large number of counties the county and commune militia 
commanders became far more visible. As provincial Party organs collapsed in 
early 1967, Party leaders at the county level sometimes strategically withdrew 
from their posts and let the militia commanders, who were protected by their 
military connections to the regional army command, pretend to assume authority, 
while the county and commune Party leaders continued to control events from 
behind the scenes. In other cases, where the militia commanders were politically 
                                                 
 51  Notably, during the Cultural Revolution nothing was more dangerous to a non-bad-class 
person than to be depicted and denounced in bad-class terms. In the horrific accounts of the 
Chinese author Zheng Yi about the murders of overthrown local officials and factional 
enemies in rural Guangxi, again and again such victims were beaten and slaughtered 
alongside bad-class people in a single orgy of killing, treating them as one and the same, as 
if to cement this linkage in the minds of both onlookers and perpetrators. A substantial 
number of such incidents are described in Section One (pp. 2-116) of Zheng Yi’s book Hongse 
jinian bei (The Red Memorial Plinth) (Taipei: Huashi Wenhua Gongsi, 1993). One particularly 
chilling example is on p. 25. 
52  There has been some confusion over this important distinction between the urban-like towns 
and the rural villages. This is exemplified by an article in The China Quarterly (March 
2003) by Andrew Walder and Yang Su titled “The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside”, 
which largely focuses not on the countryside but rather on what occurred in the county 
towns, on the factional fighting that originated there, and the mass killings that were directed 
from there. The major events within each county that it examines are “an attempted power 
seizure by a mass organization; an armed battle between two factions; and the establishment 
of a [county-level] revolutionary committee” (p. 83). Cultural Revolution mass 
organizations and factional fighting were both urban and county-town-centered phenomena. 
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ambitious, they used the opportunity to make a play for real power at the county 
capital or commune.53 
Both in rural communes where the status quo had won out against local 
opposition and in those where it had never been challenged, the commune 
authorities were apt to support the so-called loyalist-faction mass organizations of 
the county and prefectural capitals. The loyalist faction’s membership tended to 
derive from among those people in the county towns who had been politically 
favored prior to the Cultural Revolution. The faction therefore tended to uphold 
the pre-Cultural Revolution county and prefectural leaders. This appealed to 
commune and village Party leaders. Their loyalty to their pre-Cultural Revolution 
superiors often appears to have remained informally intact. In many cases, such 
feelings of loyalty especially linked the communes’ militia commanders to the 
county militia headquarters, and in turn to the county’s Party and government 
leadership. The plight of the county-town authorities, under threat from county-
town Rebel mass factions, might not, in itself, have prompted the rural leaders 
and commune militia commanders to become militarily involved. But in addition 
to their sympathy, they appear to have been fearful that a victory by the county-
seat or urban-based rebel factional alliance would jeopardize their own continued 
hold on power in the countryside. When the rural authorities received urgent calls 
to come to the aid of embattled county and prefectural leaders or to the rescue of 
flagging county-town or prefectural-city Loyalist factions, the militia corps of 
farmers were ordered out of the villages and dispatched to do their duty.54 Armed 
attacks by county and commune militias against Rebel organizations were often 
launched at the county capital and then, when the rebellious forces there were 
crushed, progressively proceeded outward and upward toward the provincial 
capital, entering some of the cities to crush urban Rebel organizations bloodily.55 
                                                 
53  This information derives from several interviewees. The assumption of authority by the militia 
heads can also be observed in the county gazetteers and Zheng Yi’s volume: again and again in 
these published sources, the leaders in the county Revolutionary Committees and at commune 
level who ordered massacres in 1968, or instructed villages to do so, are identified as militia 
commanders. 
 54  The militiamen often received remuneration for doing so. As a Jiangsu provincial radio 
broadcast of August 1967 complained, “In some regions they practice counter-revolutionary 
economism and give supplementary workpoints, money and grain to commune members to take 
part in fighting ... all to incite the peasants to enter the cities to fight the revolutionary mass 
organizations in factories, mines, administrative bureaux, and schools”. (Quoted in China News 
Analysis, No. 679 [29 September 1967], p. 2). In two of the villages in my interview sample, 
ordinary villagers were paid in workpoints for attending, in massed groups, vast struggle 
meetings that the commune authorities organized at the commune market town. 
55  In Guangxi Province, in Guilin, the provincial capital of Nanning, and other cities, county 
militias aligned to the Loyalist camp ultimately surrounded the cities and perpetrated 
massacres. On this, see Hua Linshan, Les Années Rouges. Liu Guokai lists six other 
provinces where such assaults on cities were also widespread, and he writes, “Whereas 
urban residents, workers, students, and other members of the ‘conservative’ [loyalist] faction 
still held back a little in fighting the rebels for fear of accidentally hitting good people, out-
of-town peasants had no such inhibitions; they went all the way, killing, burning, looting. 
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The county-led militias were also deployed downward in the initial part of the 
Cleansing of Class Ranks campaign in 1968. Their commanders and the 
commune-town militia commanders under them orchestrated many of the local 
mass killings, as is clear from the available documentation and interview 
accounts. Much of the statistics on mass killings that Yang Su gathered for his 
chapter appear to derive from these massacres. 
One puzzle is why the brutality perpetrated under the direction of leaders 
based in towns became, on the whole, greater than what city residents engaged in. 
Certainly, the cities experienced murderous brutality, as in the secondary schools 
of Beijing in the early period of the Cultural Revolution.56 But the cities did not 
witness the surge of mass slayings of bad-class people as occurred in some 
counties and villages. Nor, unlike many counties, were there widespread 
massacres in the cities of members of the losing faction in the initial phases of the 
Cleansing of Class Ranks campaign, with the exception of cities stormed by 
county militia.57 What was the psychology that rendered the county towns and 
rural militias more brutal in their treatment of prisoners? Might one reason be 
that the factional fighting in the towns had been more murderous than in the 
cities? If so, had pre-Cultural Revolution grievances, animosities and tensions 
been greater in towns than in cities? We have no answers, because we do not 
have sufficiently detailed knowledge about what occurred in even a single county 
or commune town during the Cultural Revolution.58 Such research is needed. 
Ethnic minorities 
The available evidence from areas inhabited by non-Han peoples strongly suggests 
that, during the Cultural Revolution, Han officials interpreted such people’s non-
conformity to the majority Han way of life as deviations from Chairman Mao’s 
teachings. Efforts were often made by officials and mobs alike to impose Han 
mores by destroying the ethnic-minority people’s religious sites and enforcing Han 
social practices. But we know all too little about what occurred, or the degree to 
which ethnic-minority youths themselves participated in the onslaughts, or whether 
                                                                                                                                    
Many cities were under siege, forcing non-partisan city-dwellers to guard the cities together 
with the rebels to prevent their fall into the hands of the peasants, whose barbarity made no 
distinction between rebels and ordinary citizens”. Liu Guokai, “A Brief Analysis”, pp. 97-
98.  
56  A large number of shocking cases are described in Wang Youqin, Wenge shounanzhe 
(Victims of the Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Kaifang Zazhi Chubanshe, 2004). 
57  In the city of Guangzhou, which was never invaded but where the Rebel faction was 
suppressed by the city’s army command in August 1968, the top several leaders of the city-
wide high-school Rebel Red Guard alliance were neither killed nor beaten by the victors. 
While the top commander of the Rebel Red Guards was imprisoned for two years, almost all 
of the other high-school Rebel leaders, including the deputy commander, were simply 
assigned in 1968 to work in villages alongside most of their schoolmates of both factions. 
On this, see Anita Chan, Children of Mao, pp. 157, 163, 191, 194. 
58  The events in a county town are described in Gao Yuan’s interesting memoir, Born Red 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), but Gao Yuan was a boy at the time and the 
events are portrayed from that perspective. 
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many ethnic communities split into factions caused by internal tensions, as occurred 
elsewhere in China.59  
We do know that during the Cultural Revolution brutal persecutions were 
carried out against several ethnic groups whose loyalty to China was considered 
suspect. The worst reported persecutions occurred in Inner Mongolia, where 
Mongols were accused of conspiring to betray China. Hundreds of thousands of 
Mongols, many of them from the countryside, were arrested in a witch hunt, and 
tens of thousands were killed while in detention.60 There is less information about 
the persecution of other ethnic peoples, or about the underlying animosities that 
sparked persecutions. 
A Needed Agenda  
In short, a great deal about the Cultural Revolution at the grass roots remains 
relatively unknown to us. We have only a scant idea, for instance, about what 
occurred at China’s state farms. We know very little about what occurred in China’s 
service sectors or hospitals or, say, among sailors on Chinese ships. It is possible to 
compile a lengthy list of the sectors of China’s populace about which we know very 
little—how they experienced the Cultural Revolution, how and why they split into 
contending factions, or what underlying grievances and animosities motivated the 
violent divisions. As seen in the preceding pages, renewed research is also needed 
about those sectors on which some research has been conducted but about which 
our knowledge is still too fragmentary—be it the universities outside Beijing, 
factories, government offices, rural China, county towns or China’s ethnic peoples. 
                                                 
59  The anthropologist Erik Mueggler provides evidence from one village, an Yi community in 
Yunnan province, showing that such a split did occur there. During both the preceding 
Socialist Education (Four Cleanups) campaign and the early Destroy Four Olds period of the 
Cultural Revolution, local officials and political activists who were themselves Yi ridiculed 
and violated some local religious practices as “superstition”. But by early 1967, the village 
government was overthrown, and two rival Red Guard groups emerged, which battled each 
other. The village’s political establishment lost out, and vengeance was exacted against all 
those who had been in charge of the village during the hated Great Leap Forward. They 
were beaten mercilessly during nightly “struggle sessions” attended by most villagers. The 
village’s Party secretary committed suicide, and his wife, who had been among those 
responsible for violating a sacred reliquary box, soon also died. By late 1969, the period of 
the Cleansing of Class Ranks campaign, the tables were turned, and upstart Red Guards and 
village shamans and diviners were in turn beaten in struggle sessions. Erik Mueggler, The 
Age of Wild Ghosts: Memory, Violence, and Place in Southwest China (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2001), pp. 258-63.  
60  On this, see William R. Jankowiak, “The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia”, The 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 19-20 (January-July 1988), pp. 273-88; also W. 
Woody [pseudonym for a Chinese author], The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia 
(Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, Occasional Paper 20, 
1993), 41 pp.; also, with terrifying details, Zheng Yi, Hongse jinian bei, pp. 285-92, and Wu Di, 
“Neirendang da xue’an shimo” (The Major Cases of Murder vis-à-vis the ‘Inner Mongolian 
Revolutionary Party’, from Beginning to End), in Song Yongyi (ed.), Wenge da tusha 
(Major Massacres of the Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Kaifang Zazhi She, 2002), pp. 
59-110. 
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The principal message of this essay is that, to comprehend Chinese society and its 
discontents during the period of Mao’s rule, such research should again become part 
of our field’s agenda, soon, before time runs out. 
What is evident from the research already conducted is that a complicated mix 
of pre-existing grievances and animosities got played out and amplified in the strife 
of the Cultural Revolution. Across a number of sectors of society, as has been 
observed, splits arose between those who had been successful political activists and 
had gained the trust of superiors as against those who had not been inclined to be 
politically activist and felt badgered and restrained by the politically favored. We 
have observed this scenario, for instance, in the high schools of working-class 
students, in government offices and in factories. Separately, we have observed 
tensions arising from the uneven treatment faced by people who bore good-class 
and middle-class family-origin labels. We have seen how this influenced divisions 
into opposing factions in high schools and in cases arising in a government office (a 
geological survey team) and a university. We have also observed a separate cause of 
hostility and factional alignment arising from relative material deprivation—as seen 
among the temporary and contract workers, apprentices, and the workforces of 
small peripheral factories and disfavored occupations. We have also witnessed how 
groups took advantage of the political instability to launch efforts to improve their 
positions politically, one example being the effort by disgruntled lineages to oust 
village leaders who belonged to, and favored, other village lineages. Finally, we 
have observed how the Party’s teachings gave rise in the heat of the Cultural 
Revolution to repression of non-Han practices and how the political teachings on 
“class struggle” and hidden enemies prompted politically insecure officials to mount 
extraordinary displays of murderous violence against people of bad-class origins 
and against groups such as China’s Mongols.  
In different types of work units and communities across China, one or the other 
of the above forms of antagonisms took precedence, as has been seen. Even so, 
several of these causes of tension were usually operating at one and the same time, 
lending added complexity to the splits into opposing factions and contributing to a 
dangerous brew of escalating violence. But we are not well enough informed about 
what elements were most significant, with what impact, in the various sectors of 
society. Nor do we have a grasp of whether there were regional differences, and if 
so, why. Nor do we have a good enough grasp of the social psychology of the 
period. Simply to reveal grievances does not explain the passion with which so 
many people responded, nor their beliefs at the time that they were acting 
righteously. 
But above all, it is important to first gain a better handle on the divisions in 
each sector of society that drove people into contending factions. As noted, these 
schisms revealed the tensions at the grassroots not only for this extraordinary period 
but also for the years preceding the Cultural Revolution. More than that, many of 
the same tensions persisted throughout the 1970s, once again largely concealed 
from view, after the mass upheavals were suppressed in 1968 and the system of 
political hierarchy and social repression was reimposed. In short, studying the 
Cultural Revolution upheavals of the late Sixties provides us with a window into 
understanding more about almost the whole sweep of the Maoist period. The 
years 1966–68, and the Pandora’s box that opened up then, are truly crucial to 
study. 
